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NOTES AND COMMENT
eight times on the entire chain, not only on those in individual states,
resulting in a severe duplication of taxes.
38
The Federal Trade Commission spent seven years and over one
million dollars to find out whether or not chain stores are worth while.
Recently the Commission filed its final report with the United States
Senate and the following paragraph from that report sums up the
Commission's final conclusion:
"Such a policy (taxing away the chain's savings in prices),
however would involve destruction of the chain's ability to
make lower prices than independents and would provoke wide
protest from consumers. Any tax on chain stores which sub-
stantially lessens their ability to undersell independents is open
to the same practical objection. If ability to undersell based
on greater efficiency or on elimination of credit and delivery
costs is destroyed by taxation, it is the consuming public which
will really pay the tax and not the chain." 39
Legislatures should be cautious lest a confiscatory tax placed on chain
stores be too easily passed on to the consumer. It should however be
indicated that the first expression of the people's desire at a public
election in this oft mooted question of chain store v. local store, re-
sulted in a definite majority vote against discriminatory chain-store
taxation.40
HENRY R. KAPLAN.
IMMUNITY FBom FEDERAL INcOME TAX BY STATE
INSTRUMENTALITIES.
* * an avalanche, of decisions by tribunals great and small
is producing a situation where a citation of precedent is tending
to count for less, and appeal to an informing principle is tend-
ing to count for more."
Constantly expanding governmental needs, changes in the eco-
nomic structure, and new ideals of social policy necessitate readjust-
ment and experimentation in tax decisions. Ordinary difficulties of
obtaining funds to operate governmental machinery are complicated
s Ibid.
'Final Report of the Federal Trade Commission, under Senate Resolution
224. 70th Cong., 1st Sess., Government Printing Office.
4 California Election of 1936-Chain store statute, passed 1935, rejected
in public referendum.
1 BENJAmIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924) 4.
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in this country by conflicting claims of state and nation, and by con-
stitutional molds developed for other times and other problems. These
difficulties coupled with the ever present reluctance of the taxpayer
assure a constant flow of tax litigation.2
In a recent Supreme Court case 3 the question arose as to whether
the salary of petitioner, as Chief Engineer of the Bureau of Water
Supply of the City of New York, was a part of his taxable income
for the purposes of the Federal Income Tax Law. The majority
opinion 4 made the answer depend upon whether the water system
of the city was created and is conducted in the exercise of the city's
governmental functions. If so, its operations are immune from fed-
eral taxations, and as a necessary corollary, "fixed salaries and com-
pensation paid to its officers and employees in their capacity as such
are likewise immune." 5
The constitutional immunity of state instrumentalities from fed-
eral taxation is implied from the nature of the federal system and the
relationship within it of state and national governments, and is usually
a restriction on taxation by either of the instrumentalities of the other.
Its nature requires that it be so construed as to allow to each govern-
ment reasonable scope for its taxing power,6 which would be unduly
curtailed if either, by extending its activities, could withdraw from the
taxing power of the other subjects of taxation traditionally within it.7
In view of the relation between the state and federal governments,
the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that neither of
said governments can impose a tax on the valid means employed by
the other government in executing its constitutional powers, since
thereby, the one government would be given power to control and
'Note (1934) 47 HARV. L. Rav. 1209.
U William Whitlock Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300
U. S. 352, 57 Sup. Ct. 495 (1937).
'By Mr. Justice Sutherland. Although there are only" two dissenting jus-
tices, the case is not as strong as it appears since Mr. Justice Stone and Mr.
Justice Cardozo straddled the whole problem. This leaves only five justices
agreeing with the majority opinion. Mr. Justice Stone's opinion .follows: "We
concur in the result upon the ground that the petitioner has brought himself
within the terms of the exemption prescribed by Treasury Regulation 74, article
643, which for the purposes of this case may be accepted as valid, its validity
not being challenged by counsel for the Government.
In the absence of such a challenge no opinion is expressed as to the need
for revision of the doctrine of implied immunities declared in earlier decisions.
We leave that subject open."
'New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U. S. 401, 57 Sup. Ct. 269 (1937).
aSee Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 522-524, 46 Sup. Ct.
172 (1926).
' South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 26 Sup. Ct. 110 (1905);
Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214, 55 Sup. Ct. 171 (1934) ; United States v.
California, 297 U. S. 175, 56 Sup. Ct. 421 (1936); see Murray v. Wilson
Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151, 173, 29 Sup. Ct. 458 (1909) (explaining South
Carolina v. United States, supra).
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burden the operation of the other.8 This principle, however, seems
incorrectly applied in the present case since the tax in question is in
no way a burden on the state or its agents.9 "A federal tax in respect
of the activities of a state or a state agency is an imposition by one
government upon the activities of the other, and must accord with
the implied federal requirement that state and local government func-
tions be not burdened thereby. So long as our present dual form of
government endures, the states, it must never be forgotten, are as
independent of the general government as that government within
the sphere is independent of the states." 'o It is to that high end that
the courts have recognized the rule, which rests upon necessary im-
plication, that neither may tax the governmental means- and instru-
mentalities of the other. 1
The case of Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell 12 points out the diffi-
culties, as cases arise within the doubtful zone, of drawing the line
which separates the activities which are subject to taxation from those
which are immune. "Experience has shown that there is no formula
by which that line may be plotted with precision in advance. But
recourse may be had to the reason on which the rule rests, and which
must be the guiding principle to control its operation. Its origin
was due to the essential requirement of our constitutional system that
the federal government must exercise its authority within the terri-
torial limits of the states, and it rests on the conviction that each gov-
ernment, in order that it may administer its affairs within its own
sphere, must be left free from undue influence by the other." 3 One
who is not an officer or employee of the state does not establish ex-
emption from federal income tax merely by showing that his income
was received as compensation for services rendered under a contract
with the state, when it does not appear that the tax impairs in any
substantial manner his ability to discharge his obligations to the state
or the ability of the state or its subdivisions to procure the service of
private individuals to aid them in their undertakings. The very na-
ture of our constitutional system of dual sovereign governments is
such as to impliedly prohibit the federal government from taxing the
'McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819); Dobbins v.
Commissioner of Erie County, 41 U. S. 435, 10 L. ed. 1022 (1842); Collector
v. Day, 78 U. S. 113, 20 L. ed. 122 (1870) ; Smith v. Short, 40 Ala. 385 (1867).
1 (1900) 14 HARv. L. REv. 155 on United States v. Owens, 100 Fed. 70
(E. D. Missouri, 1900).
"'Collector v. Day, 78 U. S. i13, 124, 20 L. ed. 122 (1870); Texas v.
White, 74 U. S. 700, 19 L. ed. 227 (1868) ("The preservation of the states and
the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care
of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the
National Government").
' Collector v. Day, 78 U. S. 113, 127, 20 L. ed. 122 (1870).
12269 U. S. 514, 46 Sup. Ct. 172 (1926).
' Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 523, 46 Sup. Ct. 172 (1926).
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instrumentalities of a state government.1 4 Just which instrumentalities
of either a state or of the federal government are exempt from taxa-
tion by the other cannot be easily stated in terms of universal applica-
tion. But the Supreme Court has held that those agencies through
which either government immediately and directly exercises its sov-
ereign powers are immune from the taxing power of the other.15
In Helvering v. Powers,16 the court said that the state "cannot
withdraw -sources of revenue from the federal taxing power by en-
gaging in businesses which constitute a departure from usual (italics
ours) government functions and to which, by reason of their nature,
the federal taxing power would normally extend." Immunity is not
established- because the state has the power to engage in the business
for what the state conceives to be the public benefit. The provisions
of the Revenue Act of 1934 17 for taxing income derived "from com-
pensation for personal service * * * of whatever kind and in whatever
form paid," is broad enough to embrace the compensation of state
officers if not constitutionally immune. Constitutional immunity of
the compensation of a state officer from federal taxation is not a neces-
sary result of his being a state officer; it depends on the nature of
the political activities assigned to him and upon whether they come
within the fundamental reason for denying federal authority to tax,
viz., necessary protection of the independence of national and state
governments in their respective spheres in our constitutional system.
In the aforementioned Supreme Court case of Brush v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue,18 the court said "We are of course quite
able to say that certain functions exercised by a city are clearly gov-
ernmental * * * while others are just as clearly private or corporate
in character * * *. But between these two opposing classes there is
a zone of debatable ground within which the cases must be put upon
"4 See as to federal taxation of state instrumentalities, Collector v. Day,
78 U. S. 113, 20 L. ed. 122 (1870) ; United States v. Railroad Co., 84 U. S.
822, 21 L. ed. 597 '(1872) ; Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S.
429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673 (1895) ; Ambrosini v. United States, 187 U. S. 1, 23 Sup.
Ct. 1 (1902) ; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (1911).
'Weston v. The City Counsel of Charleston, 27 U. S. 449, 7 L. ed. 481(1829) (its obligations sold to raise public funds); Dobson v. Commissioners
of Erie County, 41 U. S. 435, 10 L. ed. 1022 (1842) (employment of officers
who are agents to administer its laws) ; United States v. Railroad Co., 84 U. S.
322, 21 L. ed. 597 (1872) (its investment of public funds in the securities of
private corporations, for public purposes) ; Ambrosini v. United States, 187
U. S. 1, 23 Sup. Ct. 1 (1902) (surety bonds exacted by it in the exercise of its
police power). All these are so intimately connected with the necessary func-
tions of the government, as to fall within the established exemption; and when
the instrumentality is of that character, the immunity extends not only to the
instrumentality itself butt to income derived from it. See Pollock v. Farmer's
Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429. 15 Sup. Ct. 673 (1895); Gillespie v.
Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct. 171 (1922).
"293 U. S. 214, 225, 55 Sup. Ct. 171 (1934).
' §§ 212 (a), 213 (a), and 1928 §§ 21, 22 (a).
" William Whitlock Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300
U. S. 352, 57 Sup. Ct. 495 (1937).
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one side or the other of the line by what this court has called the
gradual process of historical and judicial inclusion and exclusion." 19
The court went on to say that although the power to tax is the power
to destroy,20 the courts cannot prevent the lawful exercise because of
the fear that it may lead to disastrous results. The remedy is with
the people by the election of their representatives.21
The true distinction is between the attempted taxation of those
operations of the state essential to the execution of its governmental
functions, which the state alone can do, and those activities which are
of a private character. . With the former, the United States may not
interfere by taxing agencies of the state in carrying out its purposes;
whereas the latter, although regulated by the state, and exercising
delegated authority such as the right of eminent domain, are not re-
moved from the field of legitimate federal taxation.22 Therefore, so-
called public service corporations are not exempt from taxation. In
the Brush case, Mr. Justice Sutherland contended that the operation
of a water system was a governmental function and that the salaries
of its employees were immune from federal taxation. He first pointed
out the distinction between local law as regards the liability for torts
of employees in governmental positions, and the taxing power, by
showing that the liability is imposed in tort cases "* * * to escape
difficulties in order that injustice may not result from the recognition
of technical defenses based upon the governmental character of such
corporations." 23
"Continental Bank v. Rock Island Ry., 294 U. S. 648, 55 Sup. Ct. 595
(1935). Compare Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616
(1877); Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643, 51 Sup.
Ct. 587 (1931) (The state of Maryland undertook to tax the issues of notes
of a bank of the United States. The Court held that this was a tax on the
means used by the general government to execute one of their powers, and
that the sovereignty of the state did not extend to those means).
'McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819).
1Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (1911).
Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 85 U. S. 5, 21 L. ed. 787 (1873). The major-
ity opinion of Brush v. Commissioners of Internal Revenue, 300 U. S. 352,
57 Sup. Ct. 495 (1937) cited this case and disapproved of it on this point.
City of Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 43 Sup. Ct. 534
(1923) (The distinction between the municipality as an agent of the state for
governmental purposes and as an organization to care for local needs in a
private or proprietary capacity has been applied in various branches of the law
of municipal corporations. The most numerous illustrations are found in cases
involving the question of liability for negligent acts or omissions of its officers
and agents.) See Harris v. District of Columbia, 256 U. S. 650, 41 Sup. Ct.
610 (1921) and cases cited. It has been held that municipalities are not liable
for such acts and omissions in the exercise of police power, or in the perform-
ance of such municipal faculties as the erection and maintenance of a City Hall
and Courthouse, the protection of the City's inhabitants against disease and
unsanitary conditions, the care of the sick, the operation of fire departments, the
inspection of steam boilers, the promotion of education and the administra-
tion of public charities. On the other hand, they have been held liable when
such acts or omissions occur in the exercise of the power to build and maintain
bridges, streets and highways, and waterworks, construct sewers, collect refuse
1937 ]
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Cases do not decide, but plainly suggest, that municipal water
works created and operated to supply the needs of a city and its in-
habitants are public works, and their operation is essentially govern-
mental in character. 24  The opinion in the Brush case 25 declares
"that the acquisition and distribution of a supply of water for the needs
of the modem city involve the exercise of essential governmental func-
tions, and this conclusion is fortified by a consideration of the public
uses to which water is put * * *. Certainly the maintenance of public
and care for the dump where it is deposited. See Winona v. Botzet, 169 Fed.
321 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909). See also: Brantman v. Canby, 119 Minn. 396,
138 N. W. 671 (1912) (recovery permitted for gas explosion where city fur-
nished gas to inhabitants) ; Pettingill v. Yonkers, 116 N. Y. 558, 22 N. E. 1095
(1889) (recovery permitted for injury sustained by excavation in street to lay
mains) ; Watson v. Needham, 161 Mass. 404, 37 N. E. 204 (1894) (damages
recovered for breach of contract by water commissioner to furnish water for
plaintiff's boiler, resulting in injury to plaintiff's vegetables in greenhouse heated
thereby) ; Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 Pac. 570 (1908) (City held
liable for death by drowning in conduit forming a part of City Work's Sys-
tem). This is not, however, an action for personal injuries sounding in tort,
but a proceeding which seeks in effect to determine whether immunity from
federal taxation, in respect of the activities in question, attaches in favor of a
state-created municipality-an objective so different in character from that sort
in a tort action as to suggest caution in applying as the guide to a decision in
the former a local rule of law judicially adopted in order to avoid a supposed
injustice which would otherwise result in the latter. Indian Motorcycle Co. v.
United States, 283 U. S. 570, 579, 51 Sup. Ct. 601 (1931) (held that the sale
of motorcycles to a municipal corporation for use in its police service is not
subject to federal taxation, because the maintenance of such a service is a
governmental function. The decision rests on a broad consideration of the
implied constitutional immunity arising from the dual character of our national
and state governments). We have some decisions in the states which affirm
the liability of a municipality for personal injury resulting from the negligence
of its police officials under the circumstances presented in the particular cases
dealt with. See Herron v. Pittsburgh, 204 Pa. St. 509, 54 Atl. 311 (1903);
Jones v. City of Sioux City, 185 Iowa 1178, 170 N. W. 445 (1919) ; Twist v.
City of Rochester, 37 App. Div. 307, 55 N. Y. Supp. 850 (4th Dept. 1899).
Compare Kunz v. City of Troy, 104 N. Y. 344, 10 N. E. 442 (1887), with
Altvater v. Mayor of Baltimore, 31 Md. 462, 467 (1869). The rule in respect
of municipal liability in tort is a local matter; and whether it shall be strict or
liberal or denied altogether is for the state which created the municipality alone
to decide. Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U. S. 492, 10 Sup. Ct. 1012 (1889).
2 DESERT LAND AcT, c. 107, 19 STAT. 377; Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361,
25 Sup. Ct. 677 (1905); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 27 Sup. Ct. 655
(1907); Power Co. v. Cement Co., 295 U. S. 142, 55 Sup. Ct. 725 (1935);
cf. New Orleans v. Morris, 105 U. S. 600. 26 L. ed. 1184 (1881) ; New Orleans
Gas Co. v. Drainage Commission, 197 U. S. 453. 25 Sup. Ct. 471 (1905);
Houck v. Little River District, 239 U. S. 254. 36 Sup. Ct. 58 (1915) ; cf.
Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 28 Sup. Ct. 529 (1908) ; Ashton
v. Cameron County District, 298 U. S. 513, 56 Sup. Ct. 892 (1936) (definitely
holding it to be a governmental function). Compare Bingham v. United States,
296 U. S. 211, 56 Sup. Ct. 180 (1935); Columbus v. Mercantile Trust Co.,
218 U. S. 645, 31 Sup. Ct. 105 (1910); German Alliance Insurance Co. v.
Home Water Co.. 226 U. S. 220, 33 Sun. Ct. 32 (1912) ; Dunbar v. City of
New York, 251 U. S. 516, 40 Sup. Ct. 250 (1920).
' William Whitlock Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U.
S. 352, 57 Sup. Ct. 495 (1937).
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schools, a fire department, a system of sewers, parks and public build-
ings, to say nothing of other public facilities and uses, calls for the
exercise of governmental functions. And so far as these are concerned
the water supply is a necessary auxiliary, and therefore partakes of
their nature." 26 However, the dissenting opinion in this case 2 7 by
Mr. Justice Roberts, and concurred in by Mr. Justice Brandeis, seems
to be the more logical according to our present economic and social
conditions. "It seems to me," says Mr. Justice Roberts, "that recipro-
cal rights and immunities of the national and state governments may
be safeguarded by the observance of two limitations upon their re-
spective powers of taxation. These are that the exaction of one must
not discriminate against the means and instrumentalities of the other
and must not directly burden (italics ours) the operation of the other.
To state these canons otherwise: an exaction by either government
which hits the means of instrumentalities of the other infringes the
principle of immunity if it discriminates against them and in favor
of private citizens, or if the burden of the tax be palpable and direct
rather than hypothetic and remote. Tested by these criteria the im-
position of the challenged tax was lawful." 28 Thus the test sug-
gested by Mr. Justice Roberts is whether the tax will be a burden on
the municipality or its agents. There is ample authority to support
the view, aside from its practical importance. A few cases on this
point should be considered.
Willcuts v. Bunn,29 is typical on the question of burden. The
Revenue Act of 1924 imposed an income tax upon profits derived
from the sale of personal property.3 0 The plaintiff sold at a net profit
certain municipal bonds owned by him. Upon this net profit, less net
loss suffered on the resale of similar bonds, a tax was assessed. The
'New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U. S. 401, 57 Sup. Ct. 269
(1937).
2 William Whitlock Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U.
S. 352, 57 Sup. Ct. 495 (1937).
1 Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46 Sup. Ct. 172 (1926)
("If the water works of New York City were operated by a private corporation
under a public franchise and if the petitioner had a like position with the cor-
poration there could be no question that the imposition of a federal income tax
measured by his compensation would be justified. If petitioner, instead of
holding a so-called official position under the Municipal Government of New
York City, was consulted from time to time with respect to its water problems,
his compensation would be subject to income tax. He is put into the untaxable
class upon the theory that as an official of the municipality, he is an instrumen-
tality of the state, and to tax him upon his salary is to lay a burden on the
state government, which, however trifling, is forbidden by the implied immunity
of the state from the burdens imposed by the United States"). In reason and
in logic it is difficult to differentiate the present case from that of a private
citizen who furnishes goods, performs work, or renders services to a state or a
municipality under a contract, or an officer or employee of a corporation which
does the same.
-2282 U. S. 216, 51 Sup. Ct. 125 (1931) discussed in (1931) 44 HA1v. L.
REv. 651.2243 STAT. 267, 268 (1924), 26 U. S. C. §954 (1926).
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plaintiff paid under protest, and sued to recover the money paid.
Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals. 31  Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court. Held,
that since the imposition of the tax placed no subsiantial burden upon
the borrowing power of the states, the assessment was valid.8 2 The
problem of the application of immunity of state instrumentalities from
federal tax burdens in this case may be approached from two angles.
It may be said that the liability to the tax lessens to some extent the
attractiveness of the bonds to a potential buyer and thereby inter-
feres with the state's borrowing power, making the tax unconstitu-
tional. 3 The fact that the tax is not upon money paid by the state
does not necessarily make it valid.3 4 But a similar possible diminu-
tion of salability has been allowed where inheritance taxes were levied,
measured by the total value of an estate containing government se-
curities.3 5 Such a decision suggests the second approach-the seri-
ousness of the burden imposed. Although the bonds do not enjoy a
total immunity, the assessment seems the curtailment of a privilege
rather than the imposition of a burden. The guaranteed return from
the bonds is not thereby lessened. The incidence of the tax depends
largely upon the vagaries of the money market. Moreover, the stat-
ute taken as a whole may be said to offset any burden it imposes by
a provision that losses from resale may be deducted from taxable
income.36 The decision of the case may have significance aside from
its facts in that a unanimous court joined in an opinion reaffirming
the estate tax cases and resting frankly upon a consideration of the
economic effect of the tax rather than upon absolute and conceptual-
istic reasoning.
In Peck and Co. v. Lowe 3 7 the court upheld the constitutionality
of a federal income tax upon net income derived mainly from ex-
porting. The tax was sustained on the theory that a tax upon net
income from exporting is sufficiently removed from the process of
exporting to escape burdening it unduly.38 Thus we can see that in
its application to the rule developed from McCulloch v. Maryland 39
that the instrumentality of one sovereign must be immune from taxa-
tion by the other, the Supreme Court has varied between a doctrinal
-35 F. (2d) 29 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
'Judgment was reversed in Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 51 Sup. Ct.
125 (1931).
1 Willcuts v. Bunn, 35 F. (2d) 29, 30 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929), rev'd, 282
U. S. 216, 51 Sup. Ct. 125 (1931).
Long v. Rockwood, 277 U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct. 463 (1928).
'Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 20 Sup. Ct. 829 (1900); Greiner v.
Lewellyn, 258 U. S. 384, 42 Sup. Ct. 324 (1922). But cf. Macallen v. Massa-
chusetts, 279 U. S. 620, 49 Sup. Ct. 432 (1929). Educational Films Corp. v.
Ward, 282 U. S. 379, 51 Sup. Ct. 170 (1931).
'43 STAT. 269 (1924), 26 U. S. C. §955 (1926).
=247 U. S. 165, 38 Sup. Ct. 432 (1918).
See Note (1934) 47 HARv. L. REV. 628, 652.
' See note 20, supra.
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approach which tends to condemn the tax falling in any degree upon
a government instrumentality, and an economic analysis which may
condone the tax whose burden on the function is slight.40
Powers v. Commissioner 41 held immune from federal taxation
the salary of a member of a board of trustees which managed a pub-
licly operated street railway. The same court had shortly before
granted immunity to the fees paid an auditor appointed by a state
court pursuant to statutory authority, to hear evidence in a particular
case.42 The Board of Tax Appeals, accepting the test laid down by
the Treasury Regulations, 43 had held that the taxpayer, although a
public official, did not exercise an "essential governmental function"
and was therefore liable for the tax.44 The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, however, rejected this standard, and held that the sal-
ary of a public officer is immune regardless of the function exercised.
The court questioned the present validity of classical standards but
declared that so judged, the operation of a street railway was not an
essential governmental function. This seems clearly correct.45  To
sustain this position the court quoted an abridged passage from the
opinion of the Supreme Court in the Metcalf case, to wit, "* * * any
taxation by one government of the salary of an officer of the other
* * * is prohibited." 46 But this very passage, in its entirety, as well
as the decision in South Carolina v. United States 47 and North Dakota
v. Olsen,48 are the strongest precedent for the standard set up by the
regulations. To hold that the state itself, while acting in a proprie-
tary capacity, is taxable, but that the officials through whom it carries
on these functions are not, would be an obvious absurdity. However,
the decision seems correct on the alternative ground stated by the
court: that the duties of the trustees, to the extent that they involved
regulation of public utility rates and apportionment of deficits to be
raised by taxation, were essential governmental functions, complying
with the standard advocated by the government. 49
" Developnents in the Law of Taxation (1934) 47 HAlv. L. REv. 1209.
68 F. (2d) 634 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934).
' Commissioner v. Ogden, 62 F. (2d) 334 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932) ; see Note
(1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 793, 796-798.
' U. S. TnEASURY RE UIATioNs 69, art. 88 (1926). The same provisions
are contained in id. at 74, art. 643 (1933).
"Leland v. Powers, 26 B. T. A. 1381 (1932).
"See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 172, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (1911);
Note (1925) 38 HAaRv. L. REv. 793, 798-799. Contra: Frey v. Woodworth, 2
F. (2d) 725 (E. D. Mich. 1924) (holding the salary of an employee of a
municipally owned street railway immune from federal taxation).
" Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 524, 46 Sup. Ct. 172
(1926).
1' 199 U. S. 437, 26 Sup. Ct. 110 (1905) (held a state engaged in the liquor
business subject to a federal license tax). See Note (1933) 47 HARV. L.
REv. 321.
"-33 F. (2d) 848 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929); (1929) 43 HARV. L. REv. 329
(holding a state-owned bank liable for a federal capital stock tax).
"' See Note (1934) 47 HAv. L. REv. 1209.
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From what has been stated, it becomes evident that the difficulty
of being consistent in the various decisions is due to the inconsistency
with which the term burden is used by the courts. An arbitrary, if
only tentative, test as to when a federal tax is a burden on a munici-
pality, or its government, seems more desirable than the uncertain
methods that have been employed in the past. This writer prefers
the test of actual harm, rather than any theoretical possibility of dis-
advantage. An arbitrary yet definable test, as this one necessarily is,
would be flexible enough to take care of changing social and economic
conditions.
It seems as if courts should attempt to define the territorial limi-
tations on the taxing power with reference to practical considerations
rather than to any capricious conceptualism. As long as the tradition
persists that conclusions in constitutional cases are decided from defi-
nitely pre-ordained constitutional principles rather than the exigencies
of clashing individual and public interests, the active factors in a tax
decision must remain more or less veiled behind an orthodox concep-
tualism. It is tremendously important, however, for the lawyer to
pierce this barrier, and come to grips with the active determinants
behind the course of decision. 50
The Supreme Court will have an opportunity, at its present ses-
sion, to pave the way toward federal taxation of the incomes of state
employees, and state taxation of the earnings of federal workers. If
the court supports the position of the federal government, outlined in
a brief filed by Attorney General Cummings, it will probably provide
the means for ending immunity now given the income from state and
federal securities, without the necessity of a constitutional amendment.
The Cummings Brief asks the court to overrule a number of its prior
decisions and end the tax immunity accorded to those doing business
with the state and federal governments. The same interpretation of
the constitution that provides this immunity would likewise clarify
the law on exemption of governmental salaries and bonds from dual
taxation, and reversal in this instance logically would lead to reversal
in the others.
SYDNEY SAXON.
Some Aspects of the Taxation of Federal and State Instrumentalities
(1935) 10 ST. JoiaN's L. REv. 45 by Benjamin Harrow, is a splendid article
discussing this problem from the viewpoint of the implication of the Sixteenth
Amendment ("The Sixteenth Amendment states quite simply, that 'Congress
shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source
derived.' As terms are used in common speech, this Amendment is quite inclu-
sive and in the opinion of the writer, covers income from state instrumentali-
ties * * *. So far as the federal government is concerned, all methods should
be attempted in a serious effort to restate the fundamental law of the land, that
the federal sovereignty is supreme and that the Sixteenth Amendment means
exactly what it says. The conclusion is then inescapable that the federal gov-
ernment may tax instrumentalities of the state").
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